Omada SDC - potential security issue
I am posting here because the issue appears to be with the SDC itself .... however, I would need to access my adopted / SDC managed SG2008 switch in stand-alone mode to know for certain.
Upon logging onto the SDC, in Global view, I can see my Omada devices and everything looks fine. However, when I change to Site view and look at my Omada devices there is a difference but only with my SG2008 switches device object while in Site view. In Site view, the SG2008 switches device object shows three icons on its extreme right. It's the third icon that I am taking issue with ... the icon looks like an "eye" and provides free and open access to the switches running config which for the most part is presented in plain text. To include MAC Addresses and object memberships but most alarming is the admin account of the SDC / Switch .... granted, the password is salted and hashed (thank god) but all of the other data seems a tad too "available" with no explicitly required security challenge to access. Couldn't this be locked down a little? Or, if you want to provide a semi-public icon for running configs without requiring explicit security maybe hash out some of the more sensitive details when accessed without a security challenge. And if the hashed information is of interest, perhaps satisfying a secuirty challenge could then optionally provide the unhashed version of potentially sensitive data. Really, just a PIN or password or something from the "sane and secure" side of the room .... anything but something.
Again, for me, this only manifests while in Site view on the SDC, Global view does not present the third "running config" icon on the switches device object, just the first two icons.
Why does this matter? Afterall, I had to logon to the SDC itself and then drill into the Site view to see the icon. Someone could argue that the interface is secure enough ... I argue that in this regard it isn't.
Honestly, No. It really isn't .... and if that's going to be an opposing viewpoint, I can respect it but am still asking for some additional security concession for accessing the running config even if the concession were optional to implement.
Thanks